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As  the  World  Food  Conference  opened  in  Rome  in  early
November  1974,  there were numerous,  well-publicized statements
that millions  would die of starvation  before  the  1975  harvest.  But,
widespread famine  has not occurred  in  1975,  and if available  sup-
plies  are distributed  equitably,  major famine  is unlikely during the
current crop year.
I  wish  to  examine:  (1)  the  background  of the  food  crisis  of
1972-1974,  (2)  the  World  Food Conference  and  its follow-up,  (3)
the  world  prospects  for  continued  pressures  on  world  food  sup-
plies,  and  (4)  the  dilemmas  and  policy  alternatives  that  face  the
United  States  in both the short and  long run.
EVENTS  LEADING  TO THE CURRENT  SITUATION
The  world  in  general,  and  Americans  especially,  had  grown
complacent about their food supplies  in the  1960's.  As  we entered
the  1970's,  there  was  a  "surplus"  psychology  in  developed  and
developing  countries  alike.  In  the developed  countries  there  was
the  chronic  surplus  capacity  of our  high  technology  agriculture,
and  in  the  developing  countries  there  was  the  promise  of  the
"Green  Revolution."
Indeed,  until  the early  1970's  the world  food situation  did ap-
pear well  in  hand.  World  production  of grains,  the  foundation  of
the  food  supply  for most  of the  world's  population,  rose  almost
every year from  1960 through  1972,  interrupted only by poor crops
in  the  USSR  in  1961  and  1963  and  the  great  Indian  drought  of
1965-66.  The  world  output  grew  steadily  despite  large-scale  pro-
duction  control  programs  in the United  States.
Let me  remind  you of the importance  of grains.  Except  in  the
poorest parts of the developing world, where starchy root crops are
the  staple diet, grains  in one way or another are crucial as a source
of food  supply.  In  the  poor  countries,  the  grains  are  consumed
directly  as  human  food,  supplemented  by  modest  quantities  of
meat, poultry,  and fish.  In the richer countries, only a small portion
of the grains are consumed directly, and the bulk of them are fed to
meat  and dairy  animals  and  poultry,  the  products  of which  are  a
major element  in  the  diets.  Thus,  what  happens  to  world  grain
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pens  to grain  supplies  and prices that creates  a feeling of crisis or
confidence  about  food  supplies.
Two  factors  affect  the  demand  for  grains-population  growth
and  income growth.
The  world's  population  is  about  4  billion  people  at  present,
Nearly  three-fourths  of these  people  live  in the  developing  coun-
tries  and  over  half  of them  in  Asia.  The  population  of the  de-
veloped world is  only a little over  1 billion.  The population  growth
rate  in  the  developing  world  is about  2.5  percent  per year;  in the
developed  world about  0.8 percent.  Thus,  each  year there  are  80
million more  people to feed, over 70 million of them in the develop-
ing countries.
Now,  if all the  world's  growing  population  consumed  grain  at
about  180 kilograms (a kilogram  is 2.2 pounds) per capita annually,
as did the population of the developing countries during their years
of highest consumption,  1969-1971,  an additional  output of nearly
15 million metric tons of grain would be needed annually to keep up
with  population  growth.
In the developed world in  1972,  consumption  per capita was 550
kilograms,  and  in the  United States  it was 850 kilograms.  Thus,  in
the  early  1970's  the  population  growth  in  the  developed  world
needed  another 5 million  tons  of grain  annually  to  maintain  con-
sumption  levels.  For the world to sustain its consumption  patterns
of the beginning of the decade about 20 million tons annual  increase
in output  is required.
There  are  other factors.  Generally,  except  for  1974 and  1975,
there  has  been  a slow but steady  growth  in  per capita income  and
with  it  a  rise  in the  demand  for food.  In  the  poor countries,  and
among the poorest  in all countries, the income elasticity of demand
for food  is high.  Thus,  increased affluence  adds  to the  demand for
grains.  As  poor  people  grow  wealthier,  they  increasingly  shift  to
more  meat,  dairy,  and poultry  products.  A  modest  rise of income
together with population  growth will call for an increase of nearly 3
percent  per year in  food  output  to  keep  up  with  demand  without
sharp  increases  in  prices.  And,  a  3  percent  increase  annually
means  food  production  must rise  by  over 30 million  tons  per year
and double  every  23  years!
Finally, the demand for food is highly inelastic-meaning  that it
responds  very  little  to  changes  in  price.  To  put  it  another  way,
small  changes  in availability  will  cause  large  changes  in  prices,  as
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developing  countries  because  only a fraction  of the  grain actually
enters  the  markets.  Sales  tend  to be  a  residual  after  family  con-
sumption  needs  are  satisfied.
In general,  the world  did not do  badly  in keeping  up  with the
increase  in demand from  1950 to 1970.  World food output increased
0.75  percent  per capita  per year,  and  in the  developed  countries
about  1.5 percent.  But,  this was not enough.  The  FAO estimated
that in  1974 at least 400 million persons  were suffering from malnu-
trition,  if not starvation.
But, though not good enough  to  prevent widespread  malnutri-
tion  in  some  developing  countries,  world  production  growth  kept
pace with world consumption increases until  1970. The first trouble
started  with  the corn  blight  in  the  United  States  in  1970,  but the
United States had huge stocks of grain to meet the deficit between
production and consumption.
In  1972,  the weather  was adverse  simultaneously  in the Soviet
Union,  Asia,  and  Africa,  and  world  grain  production  dropped
nearly 40 million metric tons, compared to an increase of 85  million
tons the  previous  year and  an average  increase  of 28  million  tons
per year over the previous  decade.  As a result of this decline,  and
the Russian  decision  to  purchase  from  U.S. markets-a  decision
abetted  by  our  unsound  export  subsidies  and  lack  of  export
monitoring,  world  stocks,  which  had  largely  been  held  by  the
United  States, plummeted.  By the beginning of 1973,  grain stocks
were down to  10 percent of annual consumption,  and prices began
to  rise,  sharply  in  the  United  States  and  wildly  in  some  of the
food-deficit  developing countries.
In  1973,  world  production  recovered,  with  over  half the  in-
crease in the United States and the USSR;  but still output did not
exceed  consumption,  and  stocks  were not rebuilt.  Then,  in  1974,
world  output  declined  again,  by  over  50  million  tons,  with  the
decline largely in the United States and the USSR.  By the  time of
the  World  Food  Conference,  grain  prices  were  at  record  levels.
The United States had de facto export controls,  and there were  no
significant  reserve  stocks in the  non-Communist  world.
The developing countries, buffeted by high fuel prices,  fertilizer
shortages,  and  inadequate  grain  supplies,  were  frightened  and
rightfully  so. Some,  like India and Bangladesh,  faced severe  short-
ages,  if not starvation.  India and several  other countries  used pre-
cious foreign exchange to buy high-priced food grains,  thereby set-
ting back  their development  plans  for years.  Concessionary  food
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priced,  was  sharply  reduced,  and  the  largest  source  of such  aid
-the  United States-refused to commit itself to increasing its food
aid in  late  1974 when  it  appeared  most needed.
THE  WORLD  FOOD  CONFERENCE
The  background  papers  prepared  for the World  Food  Confer-
ence  suggested that unless the  altes of ilcre(ase in food  production
in the  developing countries  were increased  by  40 percent  in Asia,
50  percent  in  Africa,  and  30  percent  in  Latin  America  over the
performance  of the previous  decade,  by  1985 the developing coun-
tries  would  have  a  net  annual  food  deficit  of 85  million  tons  in
average years and as high as  100 million tons in adverse years.  This
compares  with  a  net  deficit  of about  22  million  tons  in  1972-73.
Import  requirements of 85 to  100 million tons by  developing coun-
tries  are  impossible  to  deal  with  either financially  or  logistically,
even  if this amount  could be produced  in the  developed countries.
The  first  emphasis  of the  conference  was  on  increasing  food
production  in developing  countries.  Resolutions  were  passed  call-
ing for more  and better research and extension,  additional fertilizer
capacity  and better  fertilizer use,  more  investment  in  agricultural
infrastructure,  and new institutions to further these objectives.  The
need  for  improved  policies  to  encourage  agricultural  production
was  mentioned,  but  the  nature  of such  policies  was never  spelled
out.
The  second  emphasis  of  the  conference  was  on  world  food
security-a better food information  system,  a stocks system, and  a
food  aid  system to  avoid  the  occurrences  of  1972  and  1974.  The
FAO was given  the  responsibility  for the information  system,  but
no  significant  action  was  taken  on the  stocks  issue.  A  resolution
was passed  requesting the various donor  nations to pledge  a mini-
mum  of  10 million  tons  of food  aid annually.
The  third  area  of concentration  was  on  trade.  Little  was  ex-
pected  on  this  issue,  and the  developed  countries  guaranteed  this
outcome  by  insisting  trade  issues  could  be  discussed  only in  the
trade  negotiations  already  under way.
What has  come  out of all this?  First,  several  new  United Na-
tions institutions  were created.  One is the  World Food Council,  a
36-nation  body  responsible  for  overseeing  national  and  interna-
tional activities  aimed toward increasing  agricultural  production  in
developing  countries,  developing  an  adequate  food  security  sys-
tem, and providing food  aid.  Members  are  elected by the  General
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Secretary-General  of the United Nations and the General  Assem-
bly.  Its  first  Executive  Director  is  John  A.  Hannah,  long-time
President of Michigan  State  University,  U.S. AID  Director,  and
Deputy Secretary-General  of the World Food Conference.  He has
a  small  but  able  staff  in  Rome,  backed  by  the  FAO.  The  first
official  meeting  of  the  new  Council,  in  June  1975,  was  hardly
auspicious  in  either conduct  or outcome.
To  meet  agricultural  development  goals,  the  flow  of external
funds  would  need  to  be  doubled  to about  $5  billion  a  year.  This
task  was  given  to  two  other  new  institutions.  One  is  the  Inter-
national Agricultural  Development  Fund, called for by the confer-
ence  to  raise  an  additional  $1  billion  a  year  from  the  new  oil-
rich  countries  and  the  old  rich  countries.  An  organizational
meeting was held  in Geneva in May  1975  to determine  the intent,
rules, and potential commitment of these countries to provide such
funding.  The  U.S.  Senate  version  of the  AID  bill contains  $200
million  as  the  U.S.  contribution  to  such  a fund.  The  Administra-
tion  gave support  for such  a contribution.
The  second  new  institution  created  was  the  Consultative
Group on  Food Production  and Investment.  Its purpose  is  to  in-
crease the flow of and improve the coordination  of the many bilat-
eral  and  multilateral funds  for agricultural  development.
The mandate  and governing council of the FAO's World  Food
Program  was  reorganized  to  become  the  coordinating  body  for
concessionary  food  aid,  which  will  remain  largely  bilateral  pro-
grams.
In  summary,  the World  Food Conference  met,  passed the  de-
sired resolutions,  set up new  institutions,  and  is a part of history.
As  yet  it  has  produced  no  additional  money  for  agricultural  de-
velopment,  has  helped organize  an  improved  but  still  inadequate
food  information  system,  has  created  no  stocks  system,  and  has
not fed any hungry  person better than before.  Yet, the  crisis pre-
dicted  for  early  1975  did  not  occur  and  complacency  was  again
apparent by mid-1975.  Now, suddenly,  we are back in a near crisis
situation, with a hold on exports to the USSR (at least temporarily)
and  the  prospect  of any  significant  rebuilding  of stocks  again de-
clining.  Is the crisis  real this time and,  if so,  how do  we  meet it?
DEVELOPMENTS  IN  1975
By January  1975,  the U.S.  government  still had not  passed  its
foreign  aid  appropriations  which  fixed  the  level of concessionary
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USSR and China,  both of which had earlier made  purchases in the
U.S.  market for  1974-75  delivery,  suddenly cancelled  or deferred
purchases.  As  a  result,  U.S.  grain  prices  began  to  decline
significantly.
Second,  members  of the  Congress at the  World  Food Confer-
ence  were  concerned  by the  President's  refusal  to  increase  U.S.
food  aid  commitments.  When  the  foreign  aid  bill  was  passed,  it
contained  a section that said "not more than 30 percent of conces-
sional  food  aid  should  be  allocated  to  countries  other  than  those
which  are  most  seriously  affected  by  the  current  food  shortage."
But,  by  this  time  the  United  States  had  made  food  aid  commit-
ments to  so many of its political  friends not on the list of seriously
affected  countries  that  to  meet  these  commitments,  the  total
budget  for  concessionary  food  aid  had  to  be  increased  to  $1.47
billion,  a  73  percent  increase  over the  $849  million  expended  in
fiscal  year  1974.
In  the  meantime,  prices  had  declined  and  a  combination  of
lower prices  and more  funds meant that nearly 5.8 million tons of
food aid could be provided during the  1975  fiscal year compared to
3.1  million  tons  last  year.  Once  this  became  apparent,  the  U.S.
government  moved  as  rapidly  as  possible  to  commit  and  move
grain supplies.  These were added  to the concessionary  aid already
pledged  by  Canada  and  some  Western  European  nations  at  the
Food Conference.
While  the world  was waiting for the U.S.  government,  some of
the developing  countries,  especially  India,  bought  in  world  com-
mercial  markets;  and as  a  result of the  combination  of these pur-
chases  and  increased  food  aid,  India  and  Bangladesh  were  re-
moved from the  FAO's  critical  food  shortage  list  in  March.  The
world scraped  by  for the first half of  1975.
During  and  since  the  Food  Conference  there  has  been  much
talk and some  guilt  feelings  about the  heavy grain  consumption  in
the  United  States  as  a  result  of our  high  red  meat  consumption.
There  were  campaigns  to  have  meatless  days,  eat  less  beef,  and
many similar ideas.  About 35  million  metric  tons of the 52  million
ton drop  in  world  grain output  last  year was  in  coarse  grains,  or
feed  grains.  Virtually  all  of the decline  in  coarse  grain  output oc-
curred  in the  United States.
What  happened  in  1974-75  was  that  the  extraordinarily  high
grain  prices  and  worldwide  recession  in the  developed  countries
resulted in  the  sharpest curtailment of grain fed to animals  in his-
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States was down by 32 million metric tons during the 1974-75 crop
year,  and  coarse  grain  exports  were  down  by  5.6  million  metric
tons.  Thus,  the market  did  allocate  grain from  feed  to  food  con-
sumption,  at great cost to domestic cattle,  hog, dairy,  and poultry
producers,  and at substantial cost to U.S. consumers.  In countries
where  markets  do not allocate  supplies,  there  was  no such diver-
sion; grain fed to  livestock  in the Eastern  Bloc actually  rose.
World  wheat  production  was  also  down  by  about  19  million
metric tons in 1974-75,  with the decline concentrated  in the USSR
and  South  Asia.  The  high  prices  and  short  supplies  reduced  the
feeding of wheat in the United States  and its direct consumption  in
India.
We  can  sum  up our adjustment  to  last  year's  crisis  by noting
that the United  States reduced its grain consumption per capita by
nearly  10 percent.  The other developed market economies reduced
consumption  little,  if at all.  The  centrally  planned  economies  re-
duced  per capita consumption  by 1 or 2 percent,  and the develop-
ing economies  about  1 percent. There  were great disparities  among
the  latter.  South and  Southeast Asia took the brunt of the decline
while the newly  rich developing countries expanded consumption.
The  world's  richest  and  poorest  nations  made  the  adjustment  in
1974-75,  a  fact  that  is not widely  publicized by  the U.S.  govern-
ment, probably because  our policies  (or lack thereof)  hurt  us and
the world's  poorest  nations the  most.
LOOKING  AHEAD
During  1975  crop  prospects  in  the  Soviet  Union  and  Eastern
and Western Europe  have  deteriorated markedly,  and  those in the
United  States  and  Canada  are  still  subject  to  uncertain  weather
conditions.  Estimates of Soviet import requirements  now range up
to 25 million metric tons. They had purchased about  16 million tons
by mid-September.  Fortunately,  most of the world outside Europe
and the  Soviet  Union is enjoying good weather,  and prospects  are
good for a record  rice  crop  in Asia.  Even  so,  the food-deficit  de-
veloping  countries  will  need  both  commercial  imports  and  large-
scale  food  aid  to  avoid  further  reductions  in  their  already  inade-
quate  consumption and further  food price  inflation.
The  most  optimistic  projections  for production  in the  1975-76
crop  year  now  are  something  under  1.3  billion metric  tons  of all
grains. This  is about the  1973-74 level and well below the trend line
for world  grain production.  Assuming that the Soviets get a major
portion  of the  supplies  needed  to  maintain  their  livestock  herds,
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1976-77  crop  year  with the  same  uncertainty  as  in  the  last  two
years.
We  come  to  the  short-term  policy  dilemma:  Should  we  allow
our  market  to  remain  open  to  unlimited  exports  even  if  it:  (1)
significantly  adds  to  domestic  inflationary  pressures,  (2)  sig-
nificantly  raises  import  prices  to  poor  developing  countries  or
reduces  the quantity of food aid to them, and (3) leaves  the United
States little or no reserves  in the event of a bad crop in  1976 either
at home or abroad?
Another way to put the  question  is:  Does the "market,"  even
supplemented  by food aid abroad and food stamps at home, assure
sufficient food grains and equitably divide supplies among countries
and between years? My personal answer is "NO."  I believe the im-
mediate  policy decisions  must  alter the current international  food
marketing  system to  better serve our own  and the world's needs.
There appears to be ample evidence that the "market"  will not
induce  enough  private  storage  to  reduce  substantial  year-to-year
fluctuations  in  grain  prices,  given  variations  in  weather.  Most  of
the world's consumers  would  probably  prefer  a more  regular  dis-
tribution of output between  years.
Even more important, it would seem unreasonable to depend so
heavily  upon  the  "market"  for  distribution  among  consuming
countries,  especially  when  the  major destabilizing  country  in the
market  does not  use  the  price  system  internally  to  indicate  to  its
consumers  that grain supplies  are  short.
The  second  set of policy  issues  revolves  around  how  we  can
build  a  system  that  can  withstand  the  shock  of  bad  weather
whenever  and wherever it occurs.  This, of course,  involves  some
sort of stocks  scheme,  a subject  of infinite  economic  and political
complexity.  Above all,  it involves  a commitment on the part of the
United States,  as the world's largest  exporter,  to take  the  leader-
ship.  This  commitment  has  been  stated  by our Secretary  of State
but  is  not  shared  by  high  officials  in the  USDA  or  by our  farm
organization  leaders.
The world has consumed more grain than it has produced in five
of the  last six years.  World stocks are  at an all-time  low.  Until we
have  at least two or three  years  of good harvests,  well  distributed
around the world, we will not be in a position to handle a large drop
in  output  without  a serious  reduction  in someone's  consumption.
The  prospect  of serious  famine  is  not  imminent  but  neither  is  it
impossible  in the  next few  years.
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to feed  its growing  population  and the  U.S.  role in that task.  The
recent  crisis  may  have  positive  results  in  that  it  has  turned  the
attention of world leaders (other than Ministers  of Agriculture)  to
food  problems.
As we look ahead, the task of feeding the world is a formidable
one! The  statistics quoted earlier are  worth repeating.  To keep  up
with  prospective  population  growth  will  require  a  sustained  in-
crease in world food output of 2.5 to 3.0 percent per year, and most
of it must occur in the developing countries.  Most of the easy gains
are  gone,  especially  in  Asia,  where  the  problems  loom  largest.
Most  of the  available  land  suitable  for  crop  cultivation  is  being
used; in fact, farming on land that is too dry and too steep threatens
irreversible ecological damage in some areas. Despite high fuel and
fertilizer  prices,  most  of the  expanded  output  must  come  from
higher output  per area of land. This  means  more  irrigation,  better
varieties,  more intensive  cultivation,  and better farming  practices.
Behind this there must be research, investment, education,  and the
mobilization  of national  and  international  will.  The  margin  of
safety  is too narrow  and the  price  too  high to  allow our efforts to
lag.
There is substantial disagreement on this subject.  Some already
have  predicted  widespread  famine  as  inevitable  in  major areas  of
the world and have even talked  about "triage,"  a concept which  I
personally find  both morally unacceptable  and politically  unrealis-
tic.
On the  other  side  are  those  who  view  the  recent  situation  as
only temporary.  They believe  that technology  is adequate  and that
it  will be adopted  through the  normal  pull of market forces.
My own  view is that the  situation is  somewhere  in between.  In
the  absence  of marked  changes  in  priorities  and  a  much  greater
effort to increase food production in developing countries, the pes-
simists could be proven  right.  However,  given what is known  and
not yet applied,  and  prospects  for future  research  developments,
there is no reason that the world cannot meet its food requirements
for at  least  the  next  decade.  The  determinant  is  likely  to  be  the
political will, both in developing  and developed countries, to make
the hard policy choices to encourage the necessary production and
equitable  distribution  of food.
Finally,  what  is the  role  of the  United  States?  First,  we  must
produce  at  full  capacity  for  the foreseeable  future.  Even so,  we
cannot feed the world.  Most of the increased  food needed must be
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we  have  in the  past, do  several  things:
1. We  can  continue  to  be the world's major surplus  food  pro-
ducer to provide food for those nations  unable to grow their
own  and rich enough  to  buy from  us.
2.  We can  continue  to  supply  a significant  portion of the  con-
cessionary food  aid needed by the  poor countries for short-
term emergencies  and long-term deficits.
3.  We can, and should,  as one of the world's largest producers
and  exporters,  take  the  leadership  in  developing  an  ade-
quate world food  reserve system. We should do  this for our
own  good,  as  well  as  for the  good  of those  countries  hurt
worst by  world  shortages  and high  prices.
4.  We can,  and should,  do our share  in aiding the development
of food  production  in developing  countries.  This  means  in-
creasing  our  financial,  technical,  and  managerial  contribu-
tions  to one of the  most important  international  efforts.
None of this sounds very dramatic  and it may not satisfy those
with  a guilt complex or a penchant for self-sacrifice.  But, they are,
I believe, in the  long run the  elements  which could lead to a much
more stable  situation.
If the  United  States  exerts  its  leadership  in  these  directions,
there  will  be  real  prospects  that  the  international  community  can
eliminate  the  potential  for  food  crises,  whether  periodic  or  per-
petual.
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